Five days after he was released from prison, a schizophrenic man was arrested for attempted rape with an enhancement for inflicting bodily injury. He waived a jury trial, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to six years in prison. Committed to a state mental hospital for treatment before commencing his prison sentence, he appealed his commitment, claiming he was not properly informed about his right to a jury trial. The appeals court reviewed the trial court’s record and disagreed.

In an unpublished 2-1 decision by the Court of Appeals for California’s Second Appellate District’s Division Six, Associate Justice Kenneth R. Yegan rejected the Attorney General’s (AG) concession that the claim by appellant Billy Patton, identified as B.P, had merit. On January 6, the court ruled that proceedings before San Luis Obispo Superior Court Judge Michael L. Duffy showed that B.P. “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waived his right to a jury trial. Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert dissented.

Yegan’s opinion began with a transcript of the portion of the trial court’s proceedings related to B.P.’s acceptance of a waiver. It began by quoting B.P.’s counsel who said, “Your Honor, I’ve spoken to [appellant] about his jury trial rights, and he’s going to elect to have a court trial and waive his jury trial.”

Judge Duffy then addressed the defendant and asked him whether he understood whether he met the criteria to be classified as a mentally disordered defendant (MDO). Duffy told B.P. that he had the right to have a jury decide and that his attorney indicated that he understood that right. Duffy then asked B.P. if the court’s account of conversations between him and his attorney were correct.

B.P answered “Yeah.”

The Judge said “All right,” and asked B.P. if he wanted to waive the right to a jury trial and have a judge make the decision.

B.P. again answered, “Yeah.” Duffy then asked defendant’s counsel if he joined his client’s plea. He responded that he did.

After reviewing the transcript, Yegan cited the legal criteria for a court’s acceptance of a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial. He wrote that the law requires it be “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences” of an affirmative decision. He also stated the requirement that a waiver be voluntary “in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” He wrote that the decision must “depend on the unique circumstances of each case.”

He noted that the “appellate court independently examine(d) the entire record and reviewed the “totality of circumstances” in deciding whether B.P. ‘knowingly and intelligently’ waived his jury trial right. He then distinguished Duffy’s proper performance of waiver procedure from two other cases. In one, the trial judge failed to “expressly advise appellants” about their rights. In another, the defendant had no experience in the criminal justice system, unlike B.P. who was first arrested at age 15 and subsequently compiled a 30-page rap sheet that resulted in four separate prison terms, three of which were ordered after he had waived his right to a jury trial.

Next Yegan reviewed the Attorney General’s concession to B.P.’s claim. The AG said that the proceedings “did not track” California Supreme Court guidelines. Yegan reviewed the AG’s account of his interactions with B.P., and concluded that failure to explicitly follow the Supreme Court guidelines “does not necessarily result in the absence of “affirmative evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver.” He said there was no “predetermined ritualistic form of making the record” and that no “specific method” was required. He reiterated that instead, the “totality of circumstances” must be examined.

The justice stated that in B.P.’s case, the appellate court did review the totality of circumstances before concluding that the defendant did “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial.” He explained that although B.P.’s counsel might not have discussed every detail of a waiver plea with him, “there is no constitutional requirement that appellant understand ‘all the ins and outs’ of a jury trial in order to waive his right to one.” He also said that B.P.s “extensive experience with the criminal justice system was significant.”

Yegan then explained his disagreement with the dissent of Presiding Justice Gilbert, who opined that B.P.’s status as an MDO raised doubt about his ability to understand the waiver. He wrote that Gilbert put “too much emphasis on appellant’s mental illness” at the expense of the “totality of the circumstances.” Instead, he wrote that counsel had properly discussed with and acted on behalf of B.P. He also applauded the Supreme Court’s “recommendation of an extended jury advisement (and) waiver colloquy.” But, he stressed, “The(ir) recommendation is not a straitjacket to be used in the pursuit of perfect justice.”

While affirming the commitment of B.P. to the Department of State Hospitals as an MDO, he concluded that the jury waiver was valid because it was voluntarily and intelligently made under the totality of the circumstances.

In his dissent, as previewed by Yegan, Gilbert cautioned that his “colleagues attribute(d) a degree of sophistication to B.P. that might not be there.” Although B.P. had made three previous pleas for child molestation and other offenses, he warned that nothing was known about the legal advice he received before making his previous pleas. He wrote that B.P. “is a mentally disordered offender who suffers from schizophrenia” and that his condition “raises a doubt” about defendant’s ability to understand his waiver. He also wrote and that B.P. responding “yeah” twice to Duffy’s questions was “not reassuring,” and said he would remand as the AG suggested.