May a service dog and a support person accompany brother and sister child sexual abuse victims when they testify, or would that allowance improperly boost their credibility? This issue and several others were raised on appeal in The People v. Jermaine Dawson, which Dawson lost on appeal to Division Five of California’s First District Court of Appeal on October 2.

In a pre-trial hearing, The People told the court that J.S. and K.B. requested a support dog pursuant to California Penal Code section 868.4, subdivision (a) (2), which says that either party in a criminal or juvenile hearing “shall be afforded the opportunity to have a therapy or facility dog accompany him or her while testifying in court” if approved by the court. Defense counsel stated that he had no objection as long as the dog was qualified under the statute. The court granted the motion.

Dawson, however, objected to The People’s request for a “victim advocate” from Stuart House to be present. Stuart House is an organization that was created by the Rape Treatment Center at UCLA Medical Center that provides services to sexual abuse victims. Dawson objected, arguing that section 868.4 is unconstitutional on its face because a witness’s “internal reliance” on a facility dog bolsters their testimony and gives the witness a “false aura of veracity.” Also, he stated that by the time the case went to trial, both J.S. and K.B. were adults and might be afraid to disappoint the victim advocate. The court allowed the advocate’s presence because there “was no requirement that the victim be a minor.”

The facts that led to the trial were reported in graphic detail by the opinion. Dawson met J.S.’s mother at their church where he was the organist. The couple married when J.S. was five and his sister K.B. was a baby. The couple later had a daughter and a set of twins together. Since J.S.’s real father was “not in his life,” he bonded with Dawson and called him “dad.” This changed when “dad” began molesting him when he was nine or ten years old. The sexual abuse began when “dad” and J.S. were home alone and Dawson made him fondle his penis until he ejaculated. J.S. also had to promise not to tell anyone.

Despite J.S.’s crying and other traumatic symptoms, Dawson did not stop. In fact, his abuse escalated when he made J.S. “orally copulate him,” starting at age 11. When he was 12, Dawson began to make J.S. watch pornography with him while both of them masturbated. Soon, Dawson began to enter J.S.’s bedroom at night and continued to sexually abuse him when he was trying to sleep. J.S. said that he didn’t think he had any choice but to comply. It didn’t end there.

Dawson initiated anal sex when the boy was between 12 and 14, and this continued until J.S. was 16 or 17, when he learned Dawson had been abusing his sister K.B. since she was in second grade. Dawson entered her bedroom, fondled, licked and “dry hump(ed)” her. Dawson warned her not to tell anyone. As K.B. matured, his abuse escalated and continued until she was a high school senior.

J.S. said his mother was no help because she was “in denial.” He thus did nothing to help K.B. because he said “there was no point.” When J.S. was 17, he had a son of his own, who his mother and Dawson helped take care of because J.S. had to work and go to school. Finally, he told his aunt about his abuse, and he, K.B., his cousins, and his aunt went to the police.

The case went to trial when J.S. was 24, before Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Deborah Brazil. Dawson was convicted of a felony. At the trial, Dawson presented several witnesses. They included Pastor Paul Grimes, who had hired him and said that he believed Dawson and J.S. “had a harmonious father/son relationship.” Grimes had not spoken with Dawson after his arrest.

Nicole Dawson, the mother, also testified. She denied ever hearing about the abuse from either J.S. or K.B. She said she would “not allow anyone to hurt her children.” She also denied ever having seen Dawson “inappropriately touch any of her children.” Dawson himself also took the witness stand where he denied ever sexually abusing J.S. or K.B. He said he would never harm a child and that he “was a god-fearing man” who never went into the children’s rooms at night.

Justice Carl H. Moor authored the unpublished appellate court opinion, with concurrences by Presiding Justice Lamar Baker and Justice Dorothy Kim. The opinion recounted how Dawson’s defense continually implied that J.S. was “fabricat testimony” and had a history of lying. The defense asked J.S. whether he was receiving “financial benefit” from the prosecution.

On the third day of the trial, Los Angeles Police Officer (LAPD) Jason Kim told the court he was part of a team that worked at Stuart House, an organization that provides services to victims of child sexual abuse. Stuart House personnel had recorded conversations with J.S., and Dawson objected to their admission because they were hearsay. Brazil allowed the recording into evidence because it complied with Evidence Code sections 791 and 1236, which permit prior consistent statements. Section 791 says that a witness’s prior statement “is inadmissible to support his or her credibility unless it is offered after… evidence of a statement made by him that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing has been admitted for the purpose of attacking his credibility.” Section 1236 provides an exception to the hearsay rule for prior consistent statements offered in compliance with section 791.

Dawson next argued that Kim’s testimony was “impermissible coaching.” Brazil disagreed with this assertion as well, calling all of Kim’s responses to the defendant’s questions “neutral.” The defendant also objected to some of the prosecutor’s closing arguments. For example, she argued that if a person consistently recounts the same facts it is likely that the facts are true; she simply stated a commonly-held belief. Moor wrote, “Dawson was not prejudiced by the prosecutor’s reliance on a general statement that the jurors were free to accept or reject depending on their own experiences.”

Moor ruled that Section 868.4, which deals with support animals, is correct in law and relates to the circumstances of the dog’s presence. He wrote, “Dawson’s substantial rights were not implicated.” Similarly, on the issue of a victim advocate or support person, the appellate court concluded “Dawson has offered no evidence that the Stuart House advocate improperly interfered with J.S. or K.B.’s testimony. He is therefore unable to establish that section 868.5 is unconstitutional as applied.” Neither was there prosecutorial misconduct during The People’s closing statement.

The Court of Appeal thus affirmed the trial court in all areas under review.