Childhood Sexual Assault Claims Not Time-Barred
There is no question that children who suffer sexual abuse experience both immediate and long-term consequences. It can alter their perceptions of the world, their relationships, and their place in society for their entire lives. Recognizing the harm adults suffer from childhood sexual abuse, California has changed its statute of limitations laws several times, giving victims extended opportunities to bring sexual assault claims against public entities.
In 2019, Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218) became law. Known as the Child Victims Act, this law extended the statute of limitations for filing claims of childhood sexual abuse from eight years after the victim reached the age of majority to either the age of 40 or up to five years after discovery of the acts, whichever comes first. During consideration of the Bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee said, “Childhood sexual abuse has been correlated with higher levels of depression, guilt, shame, self-blame, eating disorders, somatic concerns, anxiety, dissociative patterns, repression, denial, sexual problems, and relationship problems. Given the horrific damage and life-long trauma that can be caused by childhood sexual assault, these claims are arguably worthy of such revival, despite the general disregard for doing so.”
Using this law, the plaintiff in West Contra Costa Unified School District V. the Superior Court of Contra Costa County, referred to as A.M.M., filed a claim against the West Contra Costa Unified School District (the District) alleging she was the victim of sexual assaults by a District employee that began when she was 14 years old in 1979 and lasted for 13 more years. The District demurred, arguing that because her claim was formerly denied for failing “to satisfy the claim presentation requirement,” reopening her case would permit “an unconstitutional gift (of public monies) in violation of Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution.” The school district argued that AB 218 would create new liability for “previously extinguished claims” and have a “devastating effect” on public finances.
Contra Costa Superior Court Judge John P. Devine overruled the District’s demurrer, and a three-justice panel from Division Five of California’s First District Court of Appeal affirmed, denying the school’s petition for a writ of mandate. Justice Mark B. Simons authored the opinion on July 31, with concurrences by Presiding Justice Teri L. Jackson and Associate Justice George B. Burns.
A.M.M. filed her initial complaint under AB 218 in December 2022 and renewed it in June 2023 with eight causes of action, including “child sexual abuse; sexual battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligence; negligence per se; negligent hiring, retention and supervision of an unfit employee; negligent supervision of a minor; and negligent failure to warn, train or educate.” She also claimed that employees at Richmond, California’s Richmond High School knew about the abuse by one of its counselors, and argued that her case should not be barred for failure to present a claim to the District.
Judge Simons’ opinion began with a discussion of the legal requirements for presenting a valid claim. He explained that “actions against a public entity for recovery of damages as a result of childhood sexual assault” are governed by California’s Code of Civil Procedure §§ 340.1 and 340.11. The District argued that A.M.M.’s claims were not filed in a timely fashion under these rules.
Section 340.1 says that there is no time limit for the commencement of actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood assault. However, §340.11 imposes a time limit for actions based on abuse that occurred before January 1, 2024. In those situations, the lawsuit must be brought “within 22 years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within five years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault,” whichever is later.
The first legal issue facing the plaintiff was the District’s argument that awarding damages “constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds.” However, several precedents clarify that so-called “gifts” of public funds are not unconstitutional if they are to be used for public purposes. The court cited precedent that said that the definition of public purposes may be “inferred” from other legislation. Thus, the opinion determined that the waiver of the “claim presentation requirement did not constitute an expenditure of public funds because AB 218…just removed a condition that the state had previously imposed when it gives consent to sue. Also, since a different statute that imposed liability for employees’ torts already existed, AB 218 “imposes no new substantive liability.”
To support this interpretation, Simons cited Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 697 (Chapman), which held that a retroactive waiver of a requirement for suit does not “create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before.” In addition, several State statutes imposed liability for conduct similar to those in A.M.M.’s case. After reviewing additional cases where the claim presentation was affected by the statute of limitations, none of them proved to be “material under the gift clause.” The opinion concluded that paying damages to A.M.M. would not constitute a “gift” because the “District was indisputably substantively liable” for its employee's sexual abuse.
Next, Simons’ opinion discussed whether AB 218 serves a public purpose. The court concluded that the legislature had a “reasonable basis” for extending the statute of limitations, thus payment of damages to the plaintiff would not constitute a gift. The legislative history of the bill was “to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to hold to account individuals and entities responsible for their injuries.”
The opinion also noted that many other courts have recognized the public purpose of money that is not just necessary for the government to function, but also those activities which “tend to make the government subserve the general well-being of society, and advance the present and prospective happiness and prosperity to the people.” It helps with healing after “the horrific damage and life-long trauma that can be caused by childhood sexual assault” and offers “relief” to a “similarly disadvantaged group that has received relief under other laws.
Simons also commented on the District’s position that it “was not asking the court to…weigh in on whether AB 218 is good law.” In response, he said, “Unfortunately that is exactly what the District and amici curiae ask this court to do.” Additionally, the opinion agreed with the plaintiff that the District lacked standing because it could not counter the California Supreme Court’s decision in Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, which cited “the well-established rule” that subordinate public entities such as school districts may not challenge state action under the Federal constitution.
The District’s writ of mandate was denied, and A.M.M. will proceed to trial. Hopefully, the resolution of the case will give her the peace of mind and body the legislature hoped for when they passed the California Child Victims Act.
