He was on trial for first-degree residential burglary. But on the morning of the second day of his trial, he did not show up because of a possible heroin and methamphetamine overdose. The trial court continued his case because they found him “voluntarily absent.” After he lost at trial, the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it found him voluntarily absent without holding an evidentiary hearing. A divided appellate court upheld the conviction, finding substantial evidence to support its finding.

On December 5, a divided California Supreme Court, by a 5-2 vote, affirmed the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The opinion was authored by Chief Justice Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye with concurrences by Justices Carol A. Corrigan, Joshua P. Groban, Martin J. Jenkins, and Patricia Guerrero. Separate dissents were filed by Justices Goodwin H. Liu and Leondra Kruger.

The case began when 19-year-old Marcos Antonio Ramirez pled not guilty to a burglary charge in April 2017. His trial date was set, but he did not appear on the day it was to begin. After receiving a doctor’s note that verified his illness, a new trial date was set for July 5, 2017. On that date, a jury was selected and sworn in. But the next day, Ramirez failed to appear once again. That morning, emergency medical care had gone to his home, but he declined medical care. A police officer, who also went to his home, saw that he was under the influence of drugs and advised him that the trial would proceed without him if it did not appear in 15 minutes. His mother took him to the emergency room instead.

After the judge learned that defendant was waiting to be seen in the emergency room, his attorney asked for a continuance to the next day. This request was denied after the prosecutor said he would be out of town. Judge James A. Boscoe of Tuolumne County Superior Court, citing California Penal Code Sec. 1043 (b)(2), said that “the absence of a defendant in a criminal felony case shouldn’t prevent…the continuing of a trial that has already been commenced…”

He then summed up the issue in the case, and the one that would remain the issue as the case traveled from the Court of Appeal and up to the Supreme Court. Boscoe said, “…the issue before the Court is whether or not “defendant is voluntarily absent from the trial...” He elaborated that the law does not permit a defendant to take advantage of his own wrongdoing to delay the process of the court, and Ramirez’s voluntary and intentional ingestion of controlled substances would fit this description. He also mentioned that this was the second time Ramirez failed to be present on a trial date.

After the testimony of two prosecutorial witnesses, the judge tried to find out whether Ramirez would take the stand. He would not, because according to his mother, “He was in no state to come to court.” The jury began deliberating and continued to the next day when Ramirez did attend. He was found guilty of the lesser charge of attempted first-degree burglary. Over objection from his attorney, the defendant was remanded to the custody of the sheriff, and the judge noted, “I think his conduct suggests he may not appear.” He was sentenced to five months in jail and was required to complete a residential drug program. He appealed, and the appellate court upheld Superior Court Judge Briscoe’s ruling.

The Supreme Court’s majority opinion began with the statement that both the federal and California state constitutions protect the right of a defendant to be present at trial. But, that right is not absolute. If a defendant is voluntarily absent, there is a waiver of the right to be present that leaves the court “free to proceed with the trial in like manner and with like effect as if he (sic) were present.”

Chief Justice Cantil—Sakauye then explained that the court must look at “the totality of facts” to determine whether an absence is voluntary and supported by an appropriate standard of proof. She summed up the issue before the court as “whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the defendant’s absence was voluntary.” She then posed one additional question the court had to answer: did the defendant have a sound reason for remaining away? Viewed in the light most favorable to the count, the majority found that the “record supports the trial court’s implicit determination that defendant had no sound basis for failing to appear on the second day of trial” and that there was no evidence to “undermine the court’s determination.”

When the defendant argued that the determination was made because of his drug use, the court said that the facts demonstrated that on the day he failed to appear, Ramirez could have come to court instead of going to the hospital. He only chose the emergency room after the police officer told him to be in court in 15 minutes, the time it would take to drive there from his home.

The dissent by Justice Liu took issue with “the sparse record” for denying the defendant’s motion for a one-day continuance and said the issue had been “properly preserved for our review.” Justice Kruger’s dissent agreed.