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Defendant’s Lateness to Court Due to LA Traffic Can’t Bar Plea Agreement
He was late to court. He claimed he was the father of a newborn who got stuck in Los Angeles traffic. The judge, who was unmoved by the burglary defendant’s excuses, disregarded his plea agreement and sent him to prison. But a California appeal court found his excuses acceptable and ruled that the judge erred when she said the plea agreement was violated.
The ruling of Judge Lisa M. Chung of the Superior Court of Los Angeles was overruled by a three-judge panel of the California Court of Appeal, Second District Third Division on March 23. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Lee Edmon, the court ruled in favor of the negotiated plea agreement, which she said is “a contract.” Associate Justice Luis A. Lavin and Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Joseph Lipner, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice, concurred. The opinion is not for publication.
Edmon began her opinion with a summary of the facts. Defendant Tony McClain broke into his ex-girlfriend’s apartment and committed several burglary and related offenses. He said another person was in the apartment at the time of the crime. He pled no contest to first-degree residential burglary and received a four-year prison sentence for which he would receive three months’ probation.
At the time the plea agreement was signed, he also signed a plea form, which stated that his failure to appear for sentencing “without a legal excuse” would transform his plea into an “open” one. When he signed the form, he also agreed to be sentenced by a judge other than the one who took his plea and to appear on May 20, 2021, at 8:30 a.m. Edmon cited precedent that confirms that a defendant who pleads guilty may remain “out-of-custody” under a waiver such as that approved in the 1988 case of People v. Cruz.
Cruz, she explained, does give the trial court the power to withdraw a plea, such as the one that was entered in the McClain case. However, she wrote, it is a question of fact that is to be reviewed “under the substantial evidence test.” She then determined that in this case, the issue presented was not one of fact, but of law.
The reason for this case began when the defendant did not show up by 9:20 a.m., fifty minutes later than had been ordered. McClain tried to explain that he was the father of a newborn, stuck in Los Angeles traffic. Superior Court Judge Chung failed to find traffic and a baby a “good cause” for tardiness. She denied his request to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to a two-year prison term for burglary. The court record does not say what time he actually showed up in court.
Additionally, Chung said that her decision was also based on “independent concerns regarding accepting this plea,” citing a number of other offenses and misdemeanor offenses committed by McClain.
Following this factual recount, Edmon began her legal analysis. First, she explained that “a negotiated plea agreement is a “contract” subject to interpretation and enforcement by “general contract principles, but subject to withdrawal if a defendant “willfully fails to appear for sentencing…” (italics in original) She wrote that decisions about willfulness are primarily questions of law. The key issue here, she said, is “whether the trial court employed the correct legal standard.
She quickly centered the issue on the question of McClain’s “willfulness.” True, McClain was late, but he was not willfully late. As a result, Edmon concluded, the court cannot find the required willfulness. His lateness had nothing to do with the negotiated plea.
Edmon found “insufficient evidence” about the defendant’s required willfulness. She referred to the way California penal statutes use the term, stating it “Impl(ies) a purpose of willingness to commit the act, that the person knows what he is doing, and intends to do what he is doing.” She agreed that he was late, but decided “he was not acting willfully.”
She concluded as anyone who lives in the area knows, “Getting stuck in traffic in Los Angeles does not constitute substantial evidence of a willful failure to appear.”
McClain was allowed to withdraw his plea and his original sentence was re-imposed.
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