What is a reasonable fear of harm from domestic violence? A California appellate court has sided with an ex-wife who wanted to extend a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her former husband. While the ex-husband argued that her fears were “objectively unreasonable,” the court ruled that the reasonable person standard does not have to be used to determine whether non-violent conduct is so upsetting that it justifies continuation of a DVRO.

The reasonable person standard in law asks whether a party behaved in a way that a community would find rational or sensible.

Defendant/appellant Christopher U., 48, had a five-year restraining order against him, issued at the request of his ex-wife Parris J., 27. Seeking to remove it, he cited Family Code §6200 of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. The Act states that a DVRO may be issued “to restrain any person…if an affidavit or testimony…shows to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” It also states that the order can be based solely on the testimony of the person requesting it and it does not have to include actual physical injury or assault.

The Act also explains that a DVRO may be based on “disturbing the peace of the other party.” The trial judge, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Mark A. Juhas, found that Christopher U. had “disturbed her peace and harassed her” and that he used money, power, and emotional abuse to control her.

The couple got engaged in February 2019. A month later, Christopher U. purchased a $4 million insurance policy on Parris J.’s life, under which he was the beneficiary. She did not know the actual terms of the policy until they were revealed during the discovery phase of the couple’s legal proceedings. Before they were married in Los Angeles, at an approximately $300,000 wedding Christopher U. paid for, Parris J. entered graduate school. After they wed, she accepted an internship in Charlotte, North Carolina. Christopher U. rented her an apartment and paid her rent during the ten weeks she was interning at Bank of America.

It was during this period that marital discord began. Christopher U. accused his wife of cheating and began making other disparaging comments and threats. He told her he was changing the locks on their home and sent her text messages that said he would “burn and donate” all the things he had purchased for her. Parris J. was “extremely concerned.” She became more concerned when she arrived home at her Charlotte apartment and found Christopher U. inside. That night, Parris J. tried to leave, but Christopher U. would not let her. Conflicts and disagreements continued, and in October 2019 Parris J. told Christopher U. to stop contacting her.

In November 2019, she requested a DVRO, which she received from the trial court. In April 2020, Christopher U. filed for a DVRO against Parris J. and received a temporary restraining order against her that day. In March 2021, Parris J. requested an order that would compel Christopher U. to change the terms of the life insurance policy, making a charity she chose the beneficiary, instead of him. She argued that his refusal to do so was an additional act of domestic violence. Juhas granted Parris J. a five-year DVRO. He also ordered Christopher U. to change the beneficiary on the life insurance policy to a charity chosen by Parris J., and he awarded her $200,000 in attorney’s fees. Christopher U. appealed. Juhas also found that Christopher U. had violated the DVRO when he sent “disparaging letters to her employer.”

During his appeal before a three-justice panel of Division Four of California’s Second District Court of Appeal, Christopher U. cited the California Legislative history of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Christopher U. said that under the Act, non-violent DVROs are to be judged by a reasonable person standard. Writing for a unanimous panel, Justice Brian S. Currey disagreed, saying that the standard was “a matter of statutory interpretation.” He found that Christopher U.’s interpretation of the legislative history was “unsupported by the statute’s unambiguous language.”

He concluded that courts do not have to “apply an objective, reasonable person standard when deciding whether a person has ‘disturbed the peace of the other party.” The relevant inquiry is simply whether the person against whom the DVRO is sought “engaged in conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroyed the mental or emotional calm of the other party.”

Currey found that the record contained substantial evidence that Christopher U. disturbed Parris J.’s peace and engaged in conduct that showed his coercive control. Among other things, he manipulated her to become financially dependent on him; repeatedly berated, insulted and demeaned her; threatened her family; accused her of cheating; and told her to take out the maximum possible in student loans instead of paying her graduate school expenses. He also made many threats, including that he would sue her ”for money lost as a result of their fraudulent union,” and that she should be ready for a “tsunami of lawsuits.” He wrote to her employer, disparaging her and stating that she had a criminal record from a “felony DUI arrest.”

For all these reasons, as well as his refusal to change her life insurance policy, the court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled in favor of Parris J., as Christopher U. had charged. Currey said that Parris J. could “reasonably find” that she was afraid that he had “incentive to kill her” and that maintaining the policy was a form of abuse.

The DVRO was affirmed, and one can only hope that Parris J. can finally regain some peace.