A convicted murderer, serving a 25-year sentence for killing his stepfather, asked for a conjugal visit from his wife. Such visits are governed by a California law that prohibits overnight stays to those who have committed violent crimes against family members. The man argued the victim was not a family member since his wife, the convict’s biological, mother was deceased. He said her death dissolved the relationship between him and his stepfather.

California’s Fifth District Court of Appeal was not persuaded and upheld the decision of Judge Michael J. Jurkovich of the Superior Court of Madera County to deny a writ of traditional mandamus that sought an order from Reina Acosta, a counselor in the state’s Department of Correctional Rehabilitation (CDCR), that would have allowed a visit from his spouse.

Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, Justice Mark. W. Snauffer of California’s Fifth District Court of Appeal said that the precedents cited by plaintiff-appellant Nathaniel Marcus Gann did not apply.

Gann is currently serving a 25-year sentence at Valley State Prison in Chowchilla, California, for murdering Timothy MacNeil. His biological sister Brae Hansen was also found guilty of first-degree murder in a separate trial.

Gann requested a conjugal visit from his wife in July 2016. His application was denied because Acosta correctly applied a law that categorizes stepfathers as members of immediate families. She did not find that the death of Gann’s biological mother ended the link between them.

Gann appealed Acosta’s denial through three administrative levels. All were denied, with one reasoning that since his sister still lived with MacNeil at the time of his death, there was still a link between Gann and his victim. After his third denial, Gann again asked that his request be granted or, in the alternative, he asked for a peremptory writ. The case went to trial in 2019, where Gann’s request was denied. He appealed to the Fifth District Court in February 2020.

Snauffer’s opinion begins with a summary of the facts, which paints a sad picture. Gann ran away from home when he was just 10, and he became a ward of the state at 13 before his mother married MacNeil. He remained in foster care until he was 18 and never lived with his stepfather. Gann’s case rests on his premise that MacNeil was no longer his stepfather for two reasons. First, his biological mother was deceased. Second, since he never lived in the same household as MacNeil, so his victim was never a legal parent.

Snauffer then turned to an explanation of the appellate court’s standard of review. He wrote that, since there was no factual dispute, the ruling would be based on a de novo review, or a decision without deference to a previous court’s ruling regarding the parameters that the law sets for “stepparents.”

He explained that CDCR has “broad quasi-legislative authority to prescribe and amend rules and regulations for the administration of prisons…” He notes that Gann did not challenge the law; rather he disagreed with its interpretation by CDCR. The Justice wrote that the court generally “defers” to an agency determination when that agency has quasi-legislative authority due to its expertise. He restated CDCR’s conclusion that “stepparent” includes the widowed husband of Gann’s birth mother. He said, “that interpretation cannot be said to conflict with the (CDCR) Secretary’s statutory authority.”

The court’s job then was to only decide whether CDCR’s interpretation of the term “stepparent” was “clearly unreasonable." It was not. First, Gann argued that it was not up to CDCR to interpret the law because there already is an “existing statutory definition.” Snauffer said that was previously determined to be false. He cited the law’s definition of immediate family member and the inclusion of the word “legal” before many relationships. For example, the law includes the words “legal stepchildren,” which he said, includes Nathaniel Gann.

This led to a discussion of several precedents in which courts heard cases that are distinguishable from Gann’s situation. Also, several legal dictionary definitions of the term “stepparent” again placed the victim in that category.

For all these reasons, the Court of Appeal found “CDCR’s interpretation of the term “stepparent” was not clearly unreasonable.” The judgment was affirmed, and the respondent was permitted to recover costs.