Judge Will Not Dismiss Sexual Abuse Lawsuit against Prince Andrew
As Queen Elizabeth prepares to celebrate her Platinum Jubilee next month, there is one thing that England’s longest-reigning-monarch will not be celebrating. Her youngest son, Prince Andrew, will have to face civil charges of sexual assault because a federal judge refused to dismiss charges against him by a woman who was a victim of Jeffrey Epstein sex trafficking when she was under 18.
In a 42-page ruling, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the United States District Court’s Southern District of New York ruled on January 12 that a lawsuit by Virginia Roberts Giuffre, now 38, against the defendant for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress can go forward. The Prince filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint because it was “legally insufficient.” Kaplan disagreed while writing that his ruling had nothing to do with the “truth or falsity” of Giuffre’s charges.
The Queen has stripped Prince Andrew, 61, of his military titles and his royal patronage. He can no longer use the title “His Royal Highness,” and is being charged in this case as a private citizen, but he can still use his title, so this article will refer to him as “the Prince.”
The Prince denied Giuffre’s charges, credibility and motives. He claimed she went along with Epstein and argued that her complaint should be dismissed because in 2009 she had settled a lawsuit with Epstein for $500,000. He claimed the settlement prohibits her from suing any other “potential defendants” and therefore releases him from any liability. He also questioned the constitutionality of a New York state law that waives the statute of limitations for children who were sexually abused.
Kaplan’s opinion opened with an explanation of the legal standard. He said he was legally prohibited from “casting doubt” on any of Giuffre’s allegations and from interpreting the meaning of the 2009 settlement with Epstein. He explained that at this stage of the case, his job is only to determine if there are “two or more reasonable interpretations” of the settlement document, and if there are, the meaning would be decided later.
The opinion then provided additional details about the sexual abuse charges, which were taken from Giuffre’s complaint. She said that the now deceased Epstein sexually abused “more than 30 minors” in concert with Ghislaine Maxwell, who was recently convicted of sex trafficking. The complaint said that Guiffre was one of the “vulnerable young girls who was lured into a scheme of abuse for Epstein’s own sexual gratification and for that of some of his wealthy and powerful friends.” She identified Prince Andrew as one of the friends to whom she was “lent out” on three occasions.
Giuffre said that she was targeted, recruited, and “groomed for abuse,” then manipulated into continued involvement due to a combination of “promises, threats, and surveillance.” She said she met Epstein in 1999 through Maxwell and became involved in activities, such as” providing massages and sexual acts” when she was working at Mar-a-Lago at age 16. She was subsequently trafficked to Prince Andrew through Epstein “against her will.”
Her encounters with the Prince took place at his home in London, at Epstein’s private island in the U.S. Virgin Islands, and at Epstein’s New York City mansion. Giuffre said she sat on Prince Andrew’s lap while he touched her, which constitutes a battery under New York law. She says she performed sexual acts with Prince Andrew because of “express or implied threats” from which she feared “death or physical injury” that caused her “emotional and physical distress and harm.”
Kaplan then reviewed other legal actions against Epstein that did not involve Giuffre, but gave context and required “judicial notice.” These included a 2006 Florida grand jury indictment for solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution and the 2009 ‘non-prosecution agreement (NDA)” between Epstein and Giuffre. Epstein said he would not contest jurisdiction of any of the victims sued in Florida and he would “waive his right to contest liability.” It is possible he entered into this agreement to avoid future litigation, Kaplan said.
Kaplan detailed parts of the agreement that led to his denial of the motion to dismiss. He said the key issues were whether Prince Andrew was identified as one of the players and whether he, as an unidentified defendant, is entitled to invoke it. He said the agreement was “far from a model of clear and precise drafting” and called it “muddled” and containing competing goals from the parties.
Prince Andrew referred to specific language in the Settlement Agreement that releases “any other persons who could have been included as a potential defendant from any and all manner of claims.” He argues that he is one of the “other potential defendants,” and as such, is released from plaintiff’s claims against him.
But, Kaplan wrote, under Florida law, the words “could have been a potential defendant,” which Prince Andrew argues include him is “ambiguous language that must be “resolved by a jury.” Kaplan reviewed Giuffre’s original complaint that asserted she was sexually abused by Epstein and “Epstein’s adult male peers, including royalty, politicians, academicians, businessmen, and other professional and personal acquaintances.” Prince Andrew argues plaintiff’s reference to royalty meant him, even though she did not identify him by name. Presumably, he thinks he was the only royal involved in the scandal.
The next question was whether Prince Andrew could be entitled to be released from the settlement agreement since he was not even a party to it as required by Florida law. Kaplan ruled that the cases Prince Andrew cited as precedents did not apply.
Finally, Prince Andrew referred to the similarity of his case with her case against Alan Dershowitz. The Prince said Giuffre released Dershowitz when the 2009 settlement agreement was raised as a potential defense. Kaplan said Dershowitz was covered because he was one of the Prince’s attorneys and not because he was a “potential defendant.”
Defendant’s final argument for dismissal is that Giuffre’s claim was filed outside the limits of New York’s statute of limitations and that a law that extended the statute for claims for those who were children when they were abused was unconstitutional. That claim has been “rejected by every New York and federal court to have encountered it,” Kaplan wrote. He then ordered the case to go forward.
