Arizona law mandates that all bicycles have and use a headlight at night. One evening, the plaintiff in a current case went out for a ride on a bicycle that did not have one. A police officer saw him, followed him to confirm the violation, and opened his door to discuss it. The bicyclist kept pedaling because he said he was scared and that his brakes did not work.

The officer kept following as the cyclist tried to escape. A short while later, the officer pulled in front of him, turned the car around, and blocked the road with his patrol car. The man on the bicycle crashed into the car, fell off his bike, was handcuffed, and suffered several head and chest injuries, as well as a dislocated wrist and sprained arm.

Plaintiff Preston Seidner sued police officer Jonathan de Vries for violating his Fourth Amendment rights, under which he is protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. He claimed de Vries used excessive force when he set up his patrol as a roadblock. Judge Douglas L. Rayes of the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona found Seidner’s claim “plausible” and concluded that a reasonable jury could find that de Vries’ actions for a minor traffic violation amounted to excessive force. De Vries disagreed and moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. When his motion was denied, he appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

In a unanimous opinion by a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Danielle J. Forrest reversed the District Court’s denial of de Vries’ qualified immunity. After viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Seidner, as required in a summary judgment decision, Forrest began her opinion by explaining that law enforcement officers may get qualified immunity from civil damages “unless they violate a clearly established constitutional right.”

The responses to two questions are used to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred: Did the officer violate a constitutional right, and was that right clearly established at the time of the event? Judge Forrest then explained the Fourth Amendment and cited precedent that holds that “whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away,” a seizure has taken place. Using this precedent, she determined that de Vries had committed a seizure.

But was it reasonable? A three-part test would answer that question. First, the court looked at the “severity of the intrusion” as determined by the type and amount of force used. Here, Forrest wrote, de Vries clearly did not hit Seidner with his car, but gave him “enough space to stop so he could avoid collision.” Also, the officer did not know about Seidner’s later claim of faulty brakes.

In addition, she classified the patrol car-roadblock as “intermediate force” rather than “deadly force,” as was the case in precedents Seidner used to support his arguments. The patrol car was parked, thus was not an “impact vehicle” traveling at high speed. The car was visible at all times, so a collision was avoidable. The roadblock did not create a “substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.”

The second part of the test for excessive force required the court to determine the “government’s interest in the use of force.” Forrest concluded that Seidner posed no threat. He was merely riding his bicycle on a well-lit residential street. In addition, traffic violations are “categorically minimal offenses and generally will not support the use of a significant level of force.” Furthermore, the roadblock only came about after Seidner pedaled away from the police officer, thus committing another legal violation. There was also a videotape that shows de Vries turning on his overhead lights, stopping Seidner, and getting out of his car while Seidner pedaled away. As a result, Forrest found that the government did have an interest that justified “some use of force.”

The third part of the test requires the court to “balance the gravity of the intrusion on the individual and the government’s need of that intrusion.” Seidner’s flight alone, she wrote, “gives law enforcement a greater measure of interest in affecting a stop.” Forrest said that the question of whether de Vries acted reasonably would be for the jury. It could not be “properly decided as a matter of law.”

She concludes that factors one and three favor the government. However, the court also examined whether there were “less intrusive alternatives to the force employed and whether proper warnings were given.” Seidner reminded the court that he received no verbal orders to stop, there were no sirens, and the roadblock could have been farther away. These were not persuasive. Forrest said overhead lights were used and the patrol car stopped when the officer tried to speak with Seidner. Also, bicycles are very maneuverable and could have enabled Seidner to get off the street with the police car.

Forrest clearly set out the need for juror-factfinders to hear the case since, in her view, neither side was clearly favored. A jury will have to determine whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation. If so, and only then, can they decide whether de Vries is entitled to qualified immunity. There is simply too much in this case that requires jury review, the opinion concluded as it reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling that held that de Vries is not entitled to qualified immunity.

Justice Morgan Christen concurred in the judgment but filed a separate concurring opinion based on her belief that the degree of force that de Vries used was “deadly” and violated the bicyclist’s constitutional rights. She believed Seidner’s traffic violation was very minor, he posed no danger, and he was pedaling so hard that it was not possible to avoid a collision after de Vries accelerated and turned his vehicle quickly to block Seidner’s path.

Both will now have their day in court.