J.S., a 13-year-old who committed new crimes while on probation for robbery and battery, was judged to not be eligible to have his records sealed by the juvenile court. After being convicted and serving 15 months in juvenile detention, he was placed on probation and made a ward of the court. This “wardship” gave the juvenile court primary responsibility for his control and treatment and resulted in a trial court finding that J.S.’s additional battery made him ineligible for sealed records. A California appellate court reversed and remanded his case for further proceedings.

The case, The People v J.S., was first heard by Placer County Superior Court Judge Todd D. Irby. On appeal, California’s Third Circuit Court of Appeal unanimously ruled that Irby’s order denying J.S.’s motion to seal his records had misinterpreted the State’s Welfare & Institutions Code § 786. The Code governs what happens when juvenile wards “satisfactorily complete” probation. It says that juvenile court wards are entitled to have their wardship petitions dismissed and all records related to their petitions sealed.

J.S. successfully argued that Irby erred when he interpreted a section of the Code as “precluding relief as a matter of law when there is a new finding of wardship during the period of probation.” The defendant/appellant pointed out that relief could only be denied if the wardship was based on a felony or a misdemeanor that involved moral turpitude. The Third Circuit reversed Irby’s ruling as a result of this “statutory misinterpretation.” The ruling was authored by Justice Elena J. Duarte, with concurrences by Acting Presiding Justice Ronald B. Robie and El Dorado Superior Court Presiding Justice Vicki Ashworth, sitting on assignment on March 5.

The facts that led to this decision began in March 2021, when J.S. was charged with six counts of second-degree robbery and misdemeanor battery when he stole a guitar, punched one minor and strangled another. He was made a ward of the court. Just a month later, he followed these acts with another battery that resulted in serious harm to several minors and a new wardship due to the People’s petition granted in June.

In February 2023, the probation department filed an application to dismiss the wardship stating there was no need for “further supervision.” The department also requested that all records related to both of J.S.’s wardships be sealed. While granting the end of probation, Irby concurrently objected to J.S.’s request to seal both records because there had been a new finding of wardship during his probation. The following month, J.S. filed a petition asking that all his records be sealed. It was denied and he appealed.

Justice Duarte’s Court of Appeal opinion quickly distinguished Irby’s interpretation of Code’s §786 that referred to “any wardship,” when the Code section actually covers only those in which there was “a new finding of wardship (or conviction) based on a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude,” and stressed that “misdemeanor battery is not a crime involving moral turpitude.”

She also explained that the distinction between the two court’s interpretations of the Code could best be understood by examining the legislative intent that revealed, according to the author of Senate Bill 1038, which created Code §786, that the Section was enacted “to further the dual purposes of the juvenile justice system: rehabilitation and reintegration, by better ensuring that juveniles have a clear pathway to clearing their records, when in compliance with existing statutory and probationary requirements.”

The appellate opinion next turned to the question of whether the language in Code §786 that clearly applies to the criminal convictions of adults also applies to wards and new findings of wardship. Duarte said that the language is not clear; rather it is ambiguous because of the way it is written. She wrote that in 2016, the original Senate bill was amended by Code §7869(c)(1) which “eliminated language that categorically precluded relief to minors on probation” for certain offenses committed by those who were 14 and older.”

The amended Code, introduced by then-Assembly member Mark Stone (D-Monterrey) also added the words “satisfactorily completed” probation, which was defined as not being convicted of either a new felony offense or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, nor did they “fail to comply substantially with the reasonable orders of probation that were within his or her capacity to perform.”

Based on the complete legislative history of Code §786, Duarte concluded that the juvenile court erred when it precluded relief to J.S. because there was no new wardship or conviction involving moral turpitude. Duarte said that the appellate court’s conclusion was “supported by the plain and ordinary meaning of the amended section’s language” and its legislative purposes of rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

In addition, she observed that the People offered “no legal analysis supporting a contrary result.” All they argued was that J.S. did not satisfactorily complete his probation because he committed an additional battery while he was on probation. She also faulted Irby for failing to examine whether J.S. had substantially complied with his probation terms. In addition, the juvenile court failed to consider the Legislature’s intent to “allow as many youths as possible to receive a second chance at rehabilitation and a clean slate when pursuing higher education or the workforce.”

The opinion’s final issue dealt with determining the proper remedy. Because the juvenile court failed to make any findings concerning J.S.’s substantial compliance with his probation, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that “remand for further proceedings is warranted.” The court reversed Irby’s order denying J.S.’s motion to seal his juvenile records and remanded his case for further proceedings. Justice Duarte also wrote that “the record reflects that the juvenile court was unaware of its discretion to grant the relief requested by J.S.”

J.S. now gets a second chance, just as the Legislature advocated and enacted.