Social media facilitates the easy posting and reposting of defamatory material. Screenshots and “share” buttons can spread libel with a simple click, and words that damage a reputation can potentially live on forever. But how does timelessness fit into libel laws that are covered by the one-year statutes of limitations that constitute the law in many states? One man argued that each new or recently discovered posting should be ruled an exception from the legal time limits. The appeals court hearing the case disagreed.

Writing for a unanimous three-judge panel for the Fifth District of the California Court of Appeal, Justice Mark W. Snauffer said that California’s one-year statute of limitations begins running as soon as the material is published on the Internet. It does not restart if published on a new website.

In addition to the statute of limitations issue, the case included motions about anti-SLAPP (anti-strategic lawsuits against public participation) motions. The California anti-SLAPP law was created to curtail lawsuits designed to “chill” First Amendment rights of people who want to discuss public issues. In his ruling, Snauffer affirmed the judgment of Kern County Superior Court Judge David R. Lampe who had granted a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, which he ruled, was time-barred.

The case began when plaintiff Richard Jones and his California City businesses--Preferred Towing and Fast Response Security--sued defendant Connie Reekes. Beginning in 2017, Reekes posted several critical articles on Jones’ Facebook page and on a site called “Eyes on You” which was operated by his business partner. Reekes also posted additional critical articles on a local Facebook site that was called “Eyes on Ewe” that accused Jones of political corruption, bribery of city officials to obtain advantages in business, and control of leaders and police in California City.

“Eyes on Ewe” stopped publishing in May 2019 as part of a settlement in a small claims case. After the settlement, all of its content was deleted and was no longer available to the public.

Jones sued Reekes for defamation in October 2020, after he had discovered “screenshot images from hundreds of negative Facebook posts from “Eyes on Ewe.” Reekes responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. She also blocked Jones from posting on all her social media sites. The opinion provided the legal definition of defamation: it injures reputation, is false, is not protected by any privilege, and exposes a person to contempt, ridicule or other injury to reputation.

Reekes denied all allegations in December 2020. She simultaneously filed an anti-SLAPP motion based on the California Code of Civil Procedure that includes information about the one-year statute of limitations that runs from the “first posting of the alleged defamatory publication under the ‘single publication’ rule.” She also noted the deletion of her “Eyes on Ewe” pages 17 months before Jones filed his suit. She explained that her anti-SLAPP motion was about political corruption, a definite matter of public interest.

Jones conceded that Reekes’ motions were “free speech in connection with an issue of public interest,” but said that his blockage from her Facebook account tolled the statute. She countered with arguments that he could have answered her accusations in another account or had a friend do so.

Snauffer’s opinion then moved to a discussion of the legal issues before the court. First, he explained that a trial court needs to consider two elements when deciding anti-SLAPP suits: the defendant must first show free speech connected to a public issue, and the plaintiff must then show the probability of prevailing. Next, he explained that defamation suits fall under a one-year statute of limitation commencing from the time “the statement in question is first published.” Next, he discussed the “single publication rule” that says that any single edition of a newspaper may give rise to “but a single potential action” for defamation.

The opinion next turned to Jones’ argument that there is an exception to the single publication rule for statements that are put before new audiences. Snauffer wrote that plaintiff’s reliance on cases such as one by Charles Manson’s lawyer that allowed a new suit when his book was published in paperback, was misplaced because it brought in a “new group of readers.” That was not true here. In addition, Snauffer pointed to another case that describes, “the need to protect Web publishers from almost perpetual liability for statements they make available to hundreds of millions of people who have access to the Internet.”

Jones next argued for a delay due to “late discovery.” But the opinion disregarded this exception since the discovery was not delayed here because Reekes’ material was hidden, as it was in precedents involving unknown letters in personnel files. Indeed, her blocking him from access to her Facebook page should have placed him “on notice that Reekes was in all probability posting commentary concerning Jones on that site, which in turn should have prompted Jones to try to circumvent the blockage.”

Because the discovery rule did not delay the cause of action and the screenshots did not constitute valid “republication” that would have avoided the single-publication rule, the judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. Jones’ suit was “time-barred,” and Reekes was permitted to recover her costs.

Given the “hundreds of millions of people who have access to the Internet” and the almost universal lack of traditional editorial fact-checkers, those who believe their reputations are being damaged should stand warned to read widely and act quickly. But also remember that free speech will be protected if the subject of the defamation is connected to a public issue.