When a long-term employee at a Catholic elementary school was fired, she sued her employer for age discrimination in violation of state law. The school claimed it was exempt from her suit because the law contained a “ministerial exception.” But was the plaintiff covered by the exemption? The trial court said yes and granted the school summary judgment. But the court of appeals was not convinced and remanded the case because there were “triable issues of fact.”

Plaintiff/appellant Frances Atkins worked at St. Cecelia elementary school for 40 years, from 1978 to 2018. She was a secretary and office administrator for most of her career, but she was also a part-time art instructor and substitute teacher. In 2012, she applied for a new position at the school, and part of her application asked her to check a box that indicated she was ““willing to maintain, by word and actions, a position of role model and witness to the Gospel of Christ that is in conformity with the teachings, standards, doctrines, laws, and norms of the Roman Catholic Church…”

Although she was not Catholic, she agreed to conduct herself in “accordance with the philosophy and mission of the Church/School, which were “inspired by Jesus’(s) example.” This agreement required her to perform tasks such as promoting knowledge of the faith and moral formation, teaching how to pray with Christ, and preparing young students to live in community, and participate in the church’s mission. At her deposition, she said she “practiced the Catholic faith every day” in class.

One year before Atkins was dismissed, a younger woman was hired as one of St. Cecelia’s secretaries. Atkins trained her for her job. When a new principal was hired, he told Atkins that it was “too much” for her to teach art and be a school secretary. Faced with a tight budget, the principal decided the school could no longer afford an art teacher, so he dismissed Atkins. The new, younger hire took over all her office administration duties.

Atkins sued the school for age discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). FEHA prohibits discrimination and harassment of employees based on age. Atkins said the school broke the law when it hired a “significantly younger and less experienced employee.”

After several COVID-related delays, St. Cecelia’s filed a motion for summary judgment. It argued that the pledges and actions Atkins took while working at the school qualified it for FEHA’s ministerial exception. Atkins, who had repeatedly said she was not Catholic, denied performing any religion-based acts while teaching art—she did not lead prayers nor place Catholic symbols in her classroom. The school, however, provided evidence of her agreements to comply with the school’s mission and philosophy.

Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Robert S. Draper granted St. Cecelia’s motion for summary judgment. A unanimous three-judge panel from Division Eight of California’s Second District Court of Appeal reversed Draper’s ruling and remanded the case to the trial court. The opinion was authored by Justice Victor Viramontes, who concluded that the school was not entitled to summary judgment because there were “triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applie(d).”

Viramontes’ opinion began with an explanation of FEHA’s ministerial exemption. He opened with the well-known quote from the First Amendment that says, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” He then explained that the ministerial exemption, the key issue in this case, is “grounded” in the First Amendment, which “precluded application of employment discrimination claims arising out of the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.” He provided several precedents to illustrate how “courts are bound to stay out of (these) employment disputes.”

These precedents regarding the applicability of the ministerial exception rest on the question of whether the employee “performed vital religious duties.” The U.S. Supreme Court instructed courts to

“…take all relevant circumstances into account” and “determine whether each particular position implicated the fundamental purpose of the exception.”

Over objections from the plaintiff, the opinion allowed St. Cecelia’s to first raise the ministerial exemption in its summary judgment request, despite its failure to do so in earlier proceedings. Atkins argued that both her office and her art teacher duties “were secular in nature, and did not involve the teaching of religion to the students.” St. Cecelia countered that the ministerial exception applied because “the school entrusted her with educating and forming students in the Catholic faith, and Atkins fully embraced that role in her teaching position.”

These, the opinion concluded, are triable issues of material fact. True, Atkins was an employee of a Catholic elementary school. The record, however, did not show that she ever taught religion nor was required to do so, even though she would occasionally lead her art students in prayer at the end of the day. It is also correct that Atkins signed a job application indicating she would “conduct herself in accordance with the philosophy and mission of the Church/School, which were “inspired by Jesus’(s) example.” Viramontes, however, wrote that Atkins’s deposition testimony about her role in making the students in her art class “behave in a ‘Christ-like’ manner is at best, ambiguous.”

Therefore, and because she served St. Cecelia’s in both classroom and office positions, her 40-year employment definitely raised issues of material fact. The school was not entitled to summary judgment based on the ministerial exception. The case was remanded so a jury will now decide whether Atkins, and perhaps others who work in religious-based schools, should be included or excluded from automatically being classified as ministers of the religious institutions that employ them.