The People v. Simmons could also be named The Legislature v. The Judiciary. The conflict between the two branches of California’s government arose in a case that challenged the right of the state’s legislature to enact the Racial Justice Act (RJA) in 2020. The Act allows those convicted of crimes to sue the state because it is never “harmless error” if a defendant is sentenced based on race, ethnicity or national origin. One dissenting judge, however, wrote that the RJA is unconstitutional because it is “the province of the judiciary, not the legislature, to determine what constitutes a ‘miscarriage of justice.’”(Italics in original)

In a 2-1 decision on October 12, Division Six of California’s Second District Court of Appeal sided with the defendant and the legislature by ruling that the RJA does not violate article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, which makes it the “province of the court to decide whether an error results in a miscarriage of justice.” It focused on whether the legislature has the right to pass a law establishing that racism at any stage of a judicial proceeding is per se a miscarriage of justice and never harmless error. The opinion was authored by Justice Arthur Gilbert with a concurrence by Justice Hernaldo B. Baltodano and a dissent by Justice Kenneth Yegan.

The case that set up the conflict involved defendant Akeem Simmons, who was convicted by a jury for the “attempted, willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder of Danny Graves.” Simmons was sentenced to life in prison, plus an enhancement of 20 years for using a firearm. Simmons appealed his conviction, arguing that the prosecutor violated the RJA when she repeatedly described him as a “light-skinned Black man” and asked him to “compare his skin tone to that of other people mentioned in his testimony.”

Simmons argued that the prosecutor’s remarks violated §745 of the RJA, which amended the State’s Penal Code to say “the state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity or national origin.” He claimed she did so several times, including when she asked the defendant to describe “Pops,” the man who had introduced him to the shooting victim Danny Graves, a “nightclub disc jockey and middleman supplier of marijuana.” For example, during cross-examination, she asked the defendant whether Pops, the mutual friend, was “dark skinned or light skinned” like him.

When Simmons answered that Pops had “brown skin. Not dark. But not as light as I am.” The prosecutor again asked, “Darker than you?” Appellant confirmed that Pops was “darker.” She continued by asking the defendant whether “sometimes people mistake you for something other than Black.” Appellant answered “Sometimes.” She continued, “Sometimes people mistake you for maybe even white, right?” He responded, “No. Never white.” She continued to refer to Simmons’ race during closing argument, saying that “people that don’t know him think he’s something other than Black.”

When appealing his conviction, Simmons argued that the prosecutor violated the RJA by continually referring to his skin tone and by saying he was not credible because he had “an ambiguous ethnic presentation.” He added that when asked about his dating habits and personality, the prosecutor had used “a racist tone.”

Gilbert’s opinion addressed the prosecutor’s behavior by providing the background of the RJA. He explained that the legislature passed the law because “discrimination in our criminal justice system based on race, ethnicity, or national origin…has a deleterious effect not only on individual criminal defendants but on our system of justice as a whole. . . . Discrimination undermines public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice and deprives Californians of equal justice under law.” The RJA, he wrote, sought to “to remedy the harm to the defendant’s case and to the integrity of the judicial system.” He explained that under the RJA, a defendant who believed the law was violated could file a motion for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court.

Applying these principles to Simmons’s case, Gilbert reported that both parties agreed that the prosecutor had violated the RJA by repeatedly using “racially discriminatory language.” An additional problem occurred because the prosecutor’s racism was first raised on appeal. Since his lawyer failed to raise it during sentencing, Simmons added and proved he had received “ineffective assistance of counsel.”

Next, Gilbert directly addressed the ability of the legislature to define a miscarriage of justice through legislation. He answered by stating, “Because the state constitution does not limit the Legislature’s power to define a miscarriage of justice, we must conclude it has properly exercised its authority to do so here.” After ruling that the Legislature acted “within its law-making authority,” he turned to “the question of the proper remedy.”

He concluded that because Simmons did not raise the prosecutor’s violation of the RJA at his sentencing hearing, the judgment was reversed and the matter of the proper remedy was remanded to the trial court.

Yegan’s dissent argued that “The Legislature may not enact a statute that amends the California Constitution. Wherever statutes conflict with constitutional provisions, the latter must prevail.” He wrote that he believed the separation of powers clause in the California Constitution was violated and concluded “The Legislature cannot dismantle California’s separation of powers doctrine by dictating to the judiciary how the California Constitution should be construed.”

Gilbert’s decision did not fully satisfy him or the Court of Appeal. The first sentence of its opinion said, “We are hopeful, indeed confident, that our Supreme Court will resolve this issue … soon.”