In normal times, both the California Constitution and the United States Constitution give criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. The pandemic’s impact on the courts has clearly demonstrated that these are not normal times.

A man whose trial for a series of horrific domestic violence incidents was continued multiple times due to COVID-19-related court closures petitioned for dismissal of his case because the delays violated his constitutional rights. The appellate court denied his motion and ruled that the pandemic gave the court “good cause” for the delays.

In a unanimous three-judge decision by the Fourth District of the California Court of Appeal, the petition by Ruben Elias for dismissal of his case was denied by Associate Justice Richard J. Huffman, with concurrences by Presiding Justice Judith McConnell and Associate Justice Terry B. O’Rourke.

Huffman began his opinion with an explanation of the circumstances that caused the continuances in Elias’ trial. He described Governor Gavin Newsom’s declaration of a state of emergency in March 2020 and subsequent actions by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court to suspend in-person jury trials and take any additional measures to protect the health of people who needed to go to court during the pandemic. As a result, the presiding judge for San Diego Superior Court, where Elias was to be tried, closed the courtrooms and extended the time requirements of California Penal Code Section 1382 which requires most felony trials to begin within 60 days.

Elias was arraigned just two months after the court closures went into effect. His trial was initially set to begin in October 2020 but was continued several times over a 15-month period, during which he remained in custody. He moved to dismiss in August 2021. He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that the appellate court regarded as a writ of mandate that would command the trial court to dismiss his case. The appellate court declared that “the people” are the real party in interest and denied the petition.

The appellate court justified its decision based on the “realities of the pandemic shutdowns.” Huffman acknowledged that the court’s ability to meet “statutory time frames” within constitutional requirements was impaired. Yet, he said that during times of health emergencies, “courts must exercise their inherent power to manage and prioritize their cases.” After reviewing the entire record, he found that the San Diego Superior Court “did just that.”

“We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause to grant the continuances or in denying Elias’s motions to dismiss,” Huffman wrote.

The appellate court opinion contained details of Elias’s domestic violence acts against D.M. Although she was struck, choked, and severely assaulted several times over a six-month period, she did not report the incidents because Elias threatened to cripple her, kill her or “make her disappear.” She finally reported him to the police in May 2020, after being subjected to serious abuse. Elias was charged with three counts of “corporal injury,” three counts of assault, and one count of making a criminal threat. His trial was then delayed several times, both by the pandemic and by issues such as the unavailability of witnesses, jurors, court personnel, or courtrooms.

When his counsel moved to either release Elias or dismiss the case, the court responded by saying that Elias’s situation was the same as “400 other defendants who were in custody and awaiting trial.”

Huffman’s discussion reviewed the petitioner’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial. He explained that “good cause” for all delays by the court must be demonstrated, although courts are given “broad discretion” to determine whether good cause exists. The standard for overturning a finding of good cause by a trial court is an abuse of discretion that “exceeds the bounds of reason.”

Elias argued that good cause was demonstrated when the prosecutor delayed the trial due to the unavailability of a material witness. The police officer who took D.M’s initial statement, which she later recanted, was unavailable. The Court found this was a reasonable continuance and not an abuse of discretion. The defendant then filed another motion to dismiss because he said a courtroom was available. The jury, however, could not be selected until the following day when no courtroom would be available.

Huffman then reiterated the difficulty of locating courtrooms and jurors during the current health emergency. He said that all continuances must be viewed within the context of the pandemic. That context had to consider that approximately 2,700 criminal cases were pending, and 500 of them involved defendants who were in custody. He said the court did properly prioritize its caseload “based on its determination of the interests of justice, and how its “judicial resources” could be used. He concluded it was reasonable to continue Elias’s case so a “shorter case” could be heard.

“The backlog here was not a routine or chronic condition for the court,” Huffman wrote, calling the pandemic “a unique non-recurring event…of such severity to justify the continuance.” He concluded with a summary of the court’s response to the State’s emergency orders and ruled that there was no violation of either Elias’s statutory or constitutional right to a speedy trial.”

“A contrary holding,” he wrote, “would require trial court personnel, jurors, and witnesses to be exposed to debilitating and perhaps life-threatening illness. Public health concerns trump the right to a speedy trial.” In addition, “lengthy pretrial incarceration unenhanced by tangible impairment” of the defense did not deprive Elias of his right to a speedy trial.

The petition for a writ of mandate was denied and the stay was lifted on the trial court proceedings.