Prostitution is a criminal offense in California. Yet, a new ruling by a California appellate court mandates that the pimp and human trafficker who forced the plaintiff to engage in prostitution must give restitution for her illegal labor.

H.B., the prostitute and petitioner in this case, met her pimp Lamar Deshawn Hall about four years ago. According to H.B., shortly after their initial meeting, Hall began to physically and mentally abuse her and make her “provide sexual services to (his) customers at the rate of $80 to $1,000 per customer.” She claims that she made about $300 a day and that Hall “took all her money.”

Hall was arrested for human trafficking and pimping under California Penal Code §236.1 and §266h. The State law defines human trafficking as “Depriving anyone of their personal liberty with specific intent to obtain forced labor or to violate California’s…pimping and pandering laws…” The State criminalizes pimping, which is defined as “someone knowingly receiving financial support or maintenance from the earnings of another person who is engaged in prostitution – or they receive compensation for soliciting on behalf of a prostitute.”

After Hall pleaded no contest to his criminal charges, H.B. requested restitution from Solano County Superior Court Judge William J. Pendergast. She asked for $31,336 for the Social Security payments Hall stole and $340,500 for her earnings from prostitution. Pendergast awarded her restitution for her financial losses but denied her request for repayment for her earnings as a prostitute. He ruled that California Penal Code §1202.4, which governs restitution, did not authorize restitution for illegal acts. The law says, “It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim who incurs an economic loss as the result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of that crime.” The statute does not appear to carve out an exception for crime victims who may also have participated in a crime, although the law does allow the court to deny restitution based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons for not doing so.”

When denying H.B.’s request for her earnings, Pendergast said, “I can see the public policy arguments on both sides, and frankly, I think the public policy arguments favor H.B.’s position, but this Court is cognizant of the fact that I’m a judge, not a legislator, and public policy decisions are for the legislature, and I do not wish to cross the lines, as it relates to separation of power.” H.B.’s petition followed.

A unanimous three-judge panel from Division Four of California’s First District Court of Appeal agreed with H.B. and on November 17, directed the trial court to vacate its original order for victim compensation and enter a new order. The opinion was written by Contra Costa Superior Court Judge Joni T. Hiramoto, sitting on assignment in Division Four.

Hiramoto began her opinion by noting that Hall did not dispute H.B.’s claim that her petition would “qualify her for extraordinary relief” if it was found to be “meritorious.” She went on to explain that relief would generally be given if the lower court abused its discretion when it denied her requested relief. She explained that it was necessary to examine the legislative intent that defines the relief sought by H.B. The opinion said that the law requires the “defendant to pay restitution to the victim in a case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct.” Therefore, she said, “Accordingly, the plain meaning of the statute strongly suggests that the trial court had a duty to “require that” Hall pay “restitution to” H.B. for that loss.”

The appellate court was not persuaded by any of Hall’s counterarguments regarding the meaning of the statute. Hall argued that the law “did not contemplate losses of prostitution earnings” nor did it discuss losses from “similar labors.” Hiramoto disagreed, saying that “there is reason to doubt Hall’s assumption that this statutory language refers only to legal labor markets,” and the amount to be paid is “the actual income derived by the defendant from the victim’s labor or services.”

Hiramoto then provided a bit of the legislative history behind Penal Code §1202.4, the restitution statute. Citing the law, she concluded that … “the plain meaning of the statute strongly suggests that the trial court had a duty to “require that” Hall pay “restitution to” H.B. for (her) loss. She also explained that the legislature had created a “Trafficking in Persons” task force to encompass the placement of “persons in situations of . . . forced labor or services, such as forced prostitution or sexual services.”

The judge then reiterated Prendergast’s belief that there are “strong public policy arguments” for including earnings from prostitution in the laws governing prostitution. She said they would be a “powerful financial deterrent to human trafficking (to) compensate(s) victims for labor they were forced to undertake.”

She then sent H.B.’s valid claim back to the trial court so it could vacate its previous order and arrive at the proper restitution amount for the petitioner.