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Registered Sex Offenders Can Be Barred From Jury Service
California’s First District Court of Appeal dismissed a suit by a group that objected to a California law that bars sex offenders from serving on juries. The Court ruled that this practice serves the legitimate aim of “ensuring fair and impartial juries.”
In a unanimous ruling, a three-judge panel affirmed the dismissal of a judgment by Alameda Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Brand that challenged a California law that excludes current sex offender registrants from jury service. Plaintiff John Doe and The Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offense Laws, Inc. (Alliance) argued that the exclusion denies registrants equal protection under the California Constitution. The trial court had sustained a complaint without leave to amend and dismissed the suit. California Attorney General Rob Bonta is the defendant in the Alliance’s appeal.
The Alliance website says the organization is “dedicated to protecting the Constitution by restoring the civil rights of registrants and their families. In order to achieve that objective, (it) will educate and litigate as well as support or oppose legislation.”
The opinion, authored by Justice Douglas P. Miller of Division Two on December 21, began with a historical overview of the California Constitution’s jury exclusion laws that date back to 1849. At that time, the Constitution prohibited “persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes” from serving on juries. Justice Miller wrote that until recently, courts have interpreted these words as barring anyone convicted of a felony from jury service unless their civil rights have been restored.
In 2019, Miller continued, the California legislature passed a bill, S.B. 310, which eliminated the omnibus exclusion of all those convicted of felonies and replaced it with “new, narrower categories.” Currently, only incarcerated, paroled or post-released felons under community supervision, non-U.S. citizens, non- California residents, non-English speakers and a few others remain excluded.
The final exclusion of the 2019 bill denies “Persons who are currently required to register as a sex offender” the right to serve on juries. This prohibition is the one at issue in the appeal.
The history of the current case begins in 2019, the same year as the passage of S.B. 310, when the Alliance challenged the section of the bill that eliminated sex offenders because they are among those who remain under community supervision after release. Attorney General Bonta said that because of their “continuing, intrusive monitoring by the authorities,” sex offenders are “more likely to harbor bias against the State than other felons.” Their rejection, Bonta said “is rationally related to a legitimate state objective and, thus, does not violate equal protection.”
The trial court accepted this argument and sustained Bonta’s demurrer without leave to amend. The court agreed that prohibiting sex offenders from serving on juries “served the legitimate aim of ensuring fair and impartial juries.” Plaintiffs filed an appeal in July 2020. They also wanted a declaration and injunction of the exclusionary section of the new law due to its equal protection violation.
Justice Miller’s dismissal of plaintiff’s suit said that the case was being heard under the standard of review that allows trial courts to dismiss equal protection claims by demurrer. A demurrer is a ruling that dismisses complaints because there are insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. The appellate court, therefore, had to decide whether “plaintiffs had stated a cause of action as a matter of law. Miller noted that “the unconstitutionality” of the challenged statute must be “clearly shown.” He said that the review would be conducted under a “rational basis standard.”
Miller wrote that jury service is not a fundamental right and exclusion from it will “pass muster” if there is a rational relationship to a “conceivable, legitimate state interest.” He rejected plaintiffs’ argument that sex offenders should be included in order to create “representative jury pools, protect the integrity of the jury system and reintegrate persons with felony convictions into the community.”
Bonta countered plaintiff’s argument with his own that claimed the bill excluding sex offenders passes “constitutional muster” because the legislature rationally determined the law serves the legitimate goal of promoting impartial jury verdicts. He cited a precedent that found that some felons “might well harbor a continuing resentment against ‘the system’ that punished him and an equally unthinking bias in favor of the defendant.” Miller said that sex offenders could have similar feelings.
Although the Alliance tried to demonstrate differences between sex offenders and others who were covered by S.B. 310, it failed to do so. The dismissal was affirmed, and there will be no sex-offender registrants on California juries.
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