San Diego Could Be Liable for Police Action by Dispatcher That Led to Kidnapped Girl’s Near Death
Mya Hendrix was kidnapped when she was 19, and her captors demanded a $2,500 ransom payment for her release. When her mother called the police for help, a dispatcher for the San Diego police department convinced her mother that the kidnapping was a scam so she should not pay the ransom demand. The abductors got angry and shot Mya multiple times. Clearly, it was not a scam, but a tragedy that severed the plaintiff’s spinal cord and left her a quadriplegic.
Hendrix sued the City of San Diego, the dispatcher Sue Marvin, and two others for bad faith and gross negligence. She also sued San Diego for vicarious liability. Presiding District Judge Todd. W. Robinson of the Southern District of California dismissed her complaint against Marvin for “failure to set forth a plausible theory that Dispatchers owed a (her) a duty.”
On September 4, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, saying that Hendrix’s complaint “sufficiently alleges” that Marvin the dispatcher, “increased Mya’s danger by convincing her mother…that Mya’s kidnapping was a scam and that (she) should not pay the demanded ransom.” Marvin said she could “almost guarantee” that the mother would receive another call, asking for additional funds, if she paid the $2,500.
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, composed of Judges Bridget Shelton Bade and Danielle J. Forrest and Tenth Circuit Judge David M. Ebel, sitting by designation, affirmed Robinson in part, reversed him in part, and remanded the case back to Robinson in an unpublished decision.
The opinion began with an explanation of the legal requirements for dismissal for failure to state a claim. Reviewers “must accept pleaded allegations as true in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and “must contain enough factual matter” to state a plausible claim for relief.
This led to a discussion of what constitutes bad faith under California’s Health and Safety Code. The panel noted that no definition of bad faith existed and determined that their opinion would only review gross negligence, which, under State law, required that the plaintiff’s pleading contain duty, breach, causation, and damages and allegations of “extreme conduct by the defendant.”
Robinson had dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint due to California’s “special relationship doctrine,” which says that a defendant who had a special relationship with another may owe a duty to protect that person from foreseeable or ongoing harm. This dismissal was rejected by the Ninth Circuit because it found that although special relationship responsibilities are rare, they may be found when “a state actor increased a (victim’s) peril by affirmative acts.” The opinion concluded that dispatcher Marvin did increase Hendrix’s danger when she convinced her mother that the kidnapping was a scam, even though it sounded similar to other scams that dispatchers often receive.
The dismissal of Hendrix’s claims against both Marvin and San Diego was reversed, while her claims against the other two dispatchers were insufficient to support her claims since they did nothing related to the “scam theory,” merely giving the mother some additional information about how to proceed.
Next, the opinion turned to Hendrix’s federal law claims. Hendrix sued San Diego under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which says a state official may be sued for “the deprivation to any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured by the Constitution and (federal laws). (Parenthesis in original) This claim was reviewed for possible abuse of discretion, which is not allowed without an order that required the plaintiff to amend her complaint to include her federal claims within 30 days. Robinson did not order the amendment but dismissed Hendrix’s federal claims anyway.
The Ninth Circuit explained that Hendrix could have a constitutional right to sue a “state actor” under the “state-created danger doctrine,” if she could prove the City of San Diego: “exposed her to a danger she would not otherwise have faced; the danger was known or obvious; and the (state actor) acted with indifference to that danger.” The Court found the first two of these conditions were met for the same reasons they had found in the state-created danger issue.
However, the last condition, Marvin’s acting with indifference to the danger, failed to show that the dispatcher actually recognized the risk. She “could not have known that convincing Mya’s mother not to pay the ransom exposed her to greater danger.” Thus, while the State allegations could proceed, there were no constitutional violations.
The Metropolitan News-Enterprise provided an update on the fate of the kidnappers. The shooter, Michael Pedraza, was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. His two co-conspirators pleaded guilty to attempted murder, and one was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole while the other received a sentence of 30 years to life in prison.
Mya Hendrix can proceed with the claims against the dispatcher and the City of San Diego. While justice was served to her captors, one can only hope that Ms. Hendrix’s serious and lifelong injuries lead to her being treated as fairly as possible as well.
