On April 23, 2020, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 on Barton v. Barr, holding that the “stop-time rule” made Andre Barton, a Jamaican national and U.S. Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), ineligible to apply for relief from deportation.

Barton was admitted into the United States in 1989 and became a lawful permanent resident three years later—commonly referred to as getting a green card. He was convicted of criminal offenses three times during his 12 years as a resident, two of which eventually elicited a notice for deportation. The removal notice came about ten years after his last offense. Barton had since attended rehabilitation, went to college, and started a family in the U.S.

Lawful permanent resident status means a non-American citizen has the legal authorization to live in the country much like a full citizen: living and working in the U.S., even joining the military. However, a lawful permanent resident can potentially face deportation and blockage of re-admission into the country for breaking American laws.

Even when facing removal from the U.S., a lawful permanent resident has the option to apply for relief, if they meet three criteria: 1) the individual must have no conviction of an aggravated felony, 2) must have been a lawful permanent resident for at least five years, and 3) must have continuously lived in the country for at least seven years. In those first seven years, the individual cannot have committed certain crimes described in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

In Barton v. Barr, Barton conceded that the U.S. government had grounds to deport him. He applied for a cancellation of the removal under the assumption that he met the legal requirements to do so successfully. Though Barton was previously convicted of felonies, they were not “aggravated” felonies; therefore, he did not fail to meet that requirement for relief application. As he obtained his green card in 1992, his five years as a resident was also readily achieved. However, the “continuous” part of the final requirement became the root of the case’s complexity, and this is where a law comes into play that fundamentally discounts some of his continuous residency in the U.S.

The government’s argument against Barton’s application for relief cites the “stop-time rule,” claiming that his 1996 conviction was within his first seven years as a legal resident. The rule puts continuous residency at a standstill if the individual is rendered “inadmissible” or “removable” by committing a crime as described in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote the Court’s majority opinion, prefacing his argument with, “A caution to the reader: These arguments are not easy to unpack.” He goes on to state that Barton could not attempt to cancel his removal because his convictions had legally rendered him “inadmissible.” Kavanaugh holds this to be true, given that Barton had been convicted within his first seven years.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued that one could not be “inadmissible” if they have already been admitted. One would have to leave the country to be readmitted. She calls the conclusion paradoxical and further determines that his offenses did not legally render him deportable.

The intricate interpretations will have some practical implications for immigration law. As far as eligibility, the Court’s opinion cuts off the ability to apply for relief from deportation if a resident commits an offense under inadmissibility grounds. This applies even if the charges alone do not qualify the individual as removable.

In these circumstances, the stop-time rule will henceforth apply. In fact, it may be established regardless of an actual conviction. Even self-incrimination and admissions could have the potential to activate the stop-time rule and consequently bar the resident from re-entering the country, or, like in Barton’s case, from typical applications to remain in the country. In summation, immigration law must keep “inadmissible” a bit more synonymous with “deportable.”