Edward Wayne Reid was charged with two violations of the California Penal Code after he grabbed and choked his “live-in girlfriend” Jane Doe for about 30 seconds. She saw spots, could barely swallow and felt dizzy. This case determined that the short time period during which she was choked was adequate to establish probable cause that she suffered a “traumatic condition” for purposes of a felony domestic violence charge.

According to Penal Code § 273.5 (a), A “traumatic condition” includes “injury as a result of strangulation or suffocation, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force.” The law defines “strangulation” and “suffocation” to include “impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of a person by applying pressure on the throat or neck.”

The altercation took place after Doe called Reid at home and interrupted a movie he was watching by asking him to buy dog food. When she got home, he threw a remote at her, then grabbed her by the throat and choked her until he let go. She later told a deputy that she was afraid and was having trouble breathing.

The People filed a complaint against Reid alleging two criminal counts: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury; and willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found no evidence of a “traumatic injury,” so Reid filed a 995 motion to dismiss the second count. It was granted and the People appealed.

A unanimous three-judge panel from Division Three of California’s Fourth Appellate District reversed the ruling of Riverside County Superior Court Judge James S. Hawkins (retired), which was made while the judge was sitting on assignment and had consulted with the magistrate. The opinion was authored by Presiding Justice Eileen C. More, with concurrences by Justices Thomas M Goethals and Maurice Sanchez.

Moore explained that Reid’s “inflicting of corporal injury” on Doe, who was a domestic violence victim, was done through strangulation. When, as here, strangulation was applied, courts are to use the definition set by § 273.5 (d), which says that “impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of a person by applying pressure on the throat or neck” constitutes a corporal injury that resulted in a traumatic condition.” The judge continued, “…the alleged impeding of Doe’s ability to breathe normally, and/or the possible impeding of the circulation of Doe’s blood to her brain were the physical manifestation – traumatic conditions- resulting from Reid’s infliction of corporate injury.”

In a footnote, the opinion also explained that Reid’s 995 motion to dismiss Count 2 was granted in error because Judge Hawkins was supposed to “sit merely as a reviewing court” and he improperly consulted with the magistrate about what occurred at the preliminary hearing.

Moore then turned to a discussion of the purpose of Penal Code § 273.5 (a), which, according to the precedent set by People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal. App.4^th is to protect persons . . . in a special relationship for which society demands, and the victim may reasonably expect stability and safety, and in which the victim, for these reasons among others, may be especially vulnerable.” The special relationship applied to Reid and Doe, his “live-in girlfriend.” The opinion next applied the appropriate Penal Code definitions along with definitions from the Merriam-Webster dictionary. “Corporal” means “of the body” and “injury” is defined as “hurt, damage or loss sustained.”

Justice Moore added, however, that the term “traumatic condition” was defined in 2011 by an amendment passed by the California Legislature as “a condition of the body, such as a wound, or external or internal injury, including, but not limited to, injury as a result of strangulation or suffocation, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force. For purposes of this section, ‘strangulation’ and ‘suffocation’ include impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of a person by applying pressure on the throat or neck.” (§ 273.5 (d).

This amendment, also known as the Diana Gonzalez Strangulation Prevention Act of 2011 or Senate Bill 430, was passed “to rectify the fact that strangulation and suffocation cases are often overlooked under existing statutes.” Moore further clarified that California case law “makes it clear that even a ‘minor injury’ is sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of a traumatic condition. Other courts also included “a wound or other abnormal bodily condition resulting from the application of some external force.” It also required a “lesser degree of harm that was required under other criminal statutes.”

The opinion then applied these new laws and interpretations to Doe’s case to determine whether the two elements of the charge were present. First, Reid did “willfully inflict corporal injury on Doe when he “grabbed her by the throat and applied pressure.” Second, when Reid applied this pressure, Doe had trouble breathing, thus he inflicted a “traumatic condition” through her “strangulation and suffocation” that impeded her normal breathing by applying pressure to her throat and neck.

Moore also concluded that the Legislature’s new definition of serious bodily injury requires “less harm” than the previous definition of “traumatic condition” that was needed to establish a felony battery. Therefore, Doe’s possible loss of consciousness “was sufficient to support a probable cause finding that the preliminary hearing evidence satisfied the lower section 273.5 standard of harm under the precedent set by People v. Gutierrez, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 952.

The opinion summarized, “Based on the plain language of section 273.5, as well as its legislative history, it is apparent that the Legislature’s intent was to modify the definition of a “traumatic condition” when there is evidence that a defendant has willfully applied force to a domestic violence victim’s throat or neck (i.e., choking).

The appellate court also concluded the preliminary hearing evidence provided a rational ground for assuming Reid had inflicted corporal injury upon Doe by strangulation or suffocation, which resulted in her traumatic condition. The dismissal of Count 2 was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court.